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Introduction
One of the main building blocks of the political economy is the assumption that those who are in power usually control certain tools to influence economic conditions and usually want to keep this power on in their hands. As long as these economic tools raise incumbents' chances to hold his position, he will have incentives to do so.
In democratic systems where politicians are elected to office, those changes of economic outcomes when conditions are affected by politicians in order to raise their chances of being elected are called political cycles. Vast majority of studies has been trying to capture political cycle by measuring changes in economic outcomes so far, like changes in unemployment, inflation, public spending etc. To achieve these changes, however, it is necessary to introduce certain directions or laws that would in turn have the intended effect in practice. A different way to capture the presence of political cycle in its early form is therefore to measure legislation activity; for instance how many laws were approved over certain period of time. This idea was introduced in study by Lagona and Padovano (2007) , who measured legislation activity on Italian data.
The purpose of this paper is to measure and explain a presence of a political cycle in legislation activity in the Czech Republic for the whole period of its modern existence, i.e. between 1992 and 2010. The analysis has been inspired by Lagona and Padovano (2007) who analyze legislation cycle in Italy. Compared to their study, we analyze elements such as laws that change multiple other laws and political legislation cycle both in the form of a number of introduced draft laws and a number of passed laws.
We are aware of the fact that the Czech Republic does not have a sufficiently long time series to get a strong conclusion about the existence of political cycle in the legislation activity. Moreover, given its transition nature over the 1990s, there might have been a number of transitory factors that influenced the legislation activity and were not directly related to a political cycle in a narrow sense. However, this paper analyzes legislation activity over the full existence of the Czech Republic as an independent and democratic country (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) and covers five electoral terms. Thus, the conclusions reached in this paper can be considered as a first step in this area of research given all available data.
The paper has the following structure. Chapter 2 provides a survey of relevant literature. Chapter 3 describes the dataset that is used in empirical analysis, the construction of variables and presents some basic characteristics of the legislation activity. Chapter 4 includes the analysis of the legislation cycle using the presented draft laws, while Chapter 5 covers the same type of analysis albeit with data on passed laws. Chapter 6 concludes the paper via highlighting the main findings of the analysis.
Survey of literature
Economic analysis of political processes has been a proper subject of economics at least since 1940s. Surveys of relevant theoretical literature can be found in Franzese (2002) , Drazen (2000) , Nordhaus (1989) or Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997) . Opportunistic political business cycle models with adaptive expectations has been pioneered by Nordhaus (1975) and Lindbeck (1976) , but received some critics along the lines of voters' irrationality and the possibility of governments to influence monetary policy in the world of independent central banks (Drazen 2000) . Rational expectations models (Rogoff and Sibert 1988; Persson and Tabellini 1990; Rogoff 1990) combine the idea of a party's competence together with an information asymmetry. Opportunistic models assume that parties which seek office are identical and pursue the same policies. This notion is supported by theoretical models developed successively by Hotelling (1929) , Downs (1957) and Black (1958) which are based on the idea of median voter theorem. According to this theorem, under some reasonable assumptions 1 , politicians have incentives to pursue identical policies preferred by median voter. Hibbs (1977) and Tufte (1978) 2 pioneered a line of political economy research opposing the median voter theorem and relying on the assumption that politicians act in partisan way:
they pursue different policies according to preferences of their electoral platform (Alesina, Roubini and Cohen 1997) . More advanced versions of this partisan model with rational expectations are represented by Alesina (1987 Alesina ( , 1988 Geršl (2006) and Kukuk (2010) .
The main source of inspiration of this work is a study by Lagona and Padovano (2007) . 
The dataset on legislation activity
This paper estimates a shape of the political legislation cycle using time as an explanatory variable (Lagona and Padovano 2007) . We focus only on certain parts of the Czech legislation, namely the categories of legislation which are assumed to be the most related to transfer payments. This is in line with Tufte (1978, p. 24) who states that "The key economic element in the electoral-economic cycle is real disposable income.
The quickest way to produce an acceleration in real disposable income is for the government to mail more people the larger checks -that is, for transfer payments to increase."
All documents negotiated in the Parliament of the Czech Republic (in the following discussion just the "Parliament") (called parliamentary prints) are publicly accessible from web pages of the Parliament and divided into different categories in subject index according to a topic to which they are related. In our model we are concerned only about topics that are mostly related to transfer expenditures. Thus we selected following five categories from the subject index: (1) allowances, (2) social necessity, (3) pensions, (4) social politics and (5) social security 3 .
Beside all the laws from categories (1)- (5), we included also all the amendments that amended these laws any time later. We made no difference between the weight of the original law from category (1)- (5) and the amendment law.
Our dataset includes data since the electoral period starting with elections in 1992. Until
December 31, 1992, institution preceding the Parliament was called the Czech National
Council. On January 1, 1993, the Czech National Council was transformed to the lower house of Parliament of the Czech Republic, the Chamber of Deputies, because of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. Until March 2010, the end of our dataset there have been 5 electoral terms, as summarized in Table 3 .1. 
-Summary of electoral terms (elections to the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic)
We consider two moments in the legislative process important for an analysis of the political legislation cycle. At first, it is the moment when the draft law is presented by an incumbent politician and the legislative process starts. At second, it is the moment when the law successfully passes the legislative process and is finally approved. These momentsnames of variables used in analysis related to these moments -are referred as Pre and Pass.
Both these moments bear some importance in the analysis; there is some information for the electorate arising from both of these moments and so both of them take a share in what we call the political legislation cycle. Moreover, the mutual relationship between these two moments offers some implications and is taken into account in this work. One methodological remark concerning presented draft laws has to be added: for the sake of simplicity we are going to refer draft laws simply as laws. Also we are using verbs to introduce and to present in the same meaning which refers to the start of the legislative process.
A short description of the Czech legislative process follows. After a bill presentment, there can be up to three readings of the draft law in the Chamber of Deputies, depending on modifying proposals in the statutory text. Afterwards the draft law has to be either approved by Other issue concerns years' division into quarters. We decided not to use standard division of a year to quarters starting with January, but rather starting with December. First quarter thus includes moths December, January and February; second quarter includes March, April and May and so on. The reason for this is that majority of elections took place in the first half of June or at the end of May, and we wanted to avoid the inclusion of the "blank" period just after the elections into the elections quarter.
We created variable which represents percentage share of a number of draft laws presented in quarter i from the whole electoral period. Formally:
where tells how many draft laws there were presented in period i, and the term expresses the total number of draft laws presented over the whole election period which include quarter i. Main explanatory variable used in the analysis is remaining time t until upcoming elections. We use, however, time to expected elections. The difference is that there might be irregularities in elections timing, but these irregularities are not known ex-ante. As a consequence, remaining time to expected elections might be different from the time that really remains in ex-post point of view. Construction of the variable is done similarly as in Khemani (2003) . Further description of exact irregularities follows. Another problem is related to these irregularities in elections timing, namely to the date when each law is passed. We decided for the latter, which has the following consequences for the dataset. There are four periods in which there is a majority of laws subject to the problem described in the previous paragraph. These periods have different assessed position in electoral cycle, which is summarized in 
The model and estimates
Our main hypothesis to be tested is that legislation activity expressed as a number laws presented or approved, is influenced by remaining time until upcoming elections. We expect to find that the remaining time influences the legislation activity in a way that activity raises as the elections are getting closer.
However, we are aware that this way of analysis might capture the rising activity, but does not explain reasons of the causality from time to activity. One reason can stem from the politicians' interest to display vigour and to attract voters this way. But nature of legislation process itself provides another possible reason; preparation of a law proposal takes some time and because of limited bureaucratic capacities it is likely that more legislation activity in a sense we measure it in our analysis will be displayed towards later parts of an electoral cycle.
The two above stated determinants of amount of legislation activity are likely to be captured by the time variable we use, at least to some extent. Nevertheless, the legislation process is fairly complex procedure affected by a lot of aspects. Political reality affects strategic behavior in relation to voters and other political parties including coalition partners. This also has to be taken into account when trying to explain the way how legislation activity is formed.
In the following part we are going to estimate several models seeking to explain the shape of the legislation cycle by the time remaining until the expected elections. Models with dependent variable being quantities of both presented and passed laws are built.
Beside the basic regression with remaining time in the first power as the explanatory variable, a polynomial regression up to the power four is used to capture more subtle variations in legislation activity over the cycle 5 . We admit that interpretation of such relationship is problematic; coefficients obtained for a dependent variable that is used in higher powers capture relationship that is difficult to interpret. On the other hand, such regression provides us a good visual interpretation. As estimated models exhibit heteroskedastic residuals, we are using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors to treat this problem.
Presented laws
In order to test for increasing legislation activity over the cycle, we regressed the variable Pre on variable that represents time remaining to the expected elections. As discussed above, variable Pre captures the legislation activity as a percentage of law proposals presented in a single period (quarter) of the whole electoral cycle. . However, Figure 4 .2 (a), which shows fitted line and observed values of Pre against t, suggests that there is a substantial decrease of the activity just before the elections (the left-hand side of the picture). We provide the following explanation and treatment of the problem.
In order to become a valid law, a law proposal has to be passed through a legislation process, as described in Chapter 3. Such legislation process takes time and it is plausible for a party that proposes the law that the law is approved before the upcoming elections. In other words, there has to be some time during which the legislation process can take place and it would not be optimal to present the law just before the elections, when there is a high risk that the time for the legislation process to take place is not sufficient. 
.1 -Empirical distribution of lengths of legislative processes of monitored laws
We assume that the exact length of the legislation process is exogenous to some extent and so there should be a time reserve to minimize the risk of not passing the law. In the following model, we add a dummy variable BEle, which is equal to one when time to the expected elections is one or two quarters, and zero otherwise. This variable should reflect a decrease in legislation activity (in terms of presented laws) two quarters before the elections. Table 4 .1 shows that after all variables are significant when BEle is included into the model. More importantly, variable t has negative coefficient, which in our setup corresponds to increasing activity over the cycle. The p-value is 1,32e-05 which is sufficiently low to reject the non-negativity hypothesis of one-tailed t-test. Figure 4 .2 (b) depicts the trend line over time, omitting last two quarters before the elections. Adjusted R-squared value is 0,2186 for this model. This rather low value suggests that amount of legislation activity is determined largely by other factors than time (in its firs power).
Next, we perform the analysis using polynomial regression. Higher powers of the time variable were added, up to the power four. Both models with dummy BEle and without BEle are used. By adding the t2 and t3 variables, results became worse in terms of variable significance, with exception of the 2nd degree polynomial estimate (nevertheless, explanatory power of this model is rather low). See Table 4 .1 for summary of these models.
Finally, adding the fourth degree to the polynomial function, coefficient estimates became significant, both for models with and without BEle dummy variable. Figures 4.2 (c) and (d) show result of these regressions against time t. Both models yield very similar results in terms of shape of the fitted curve.
We can see that the cycle starts with minimum activity in the quarter immediately after the elections (Over the dataset, observations with t = 16, i.e. 16 quarters to the expected upcoming elections, correspond to the quarter immediately after the elections). So far it has been observed in the Czech Republic that governments are not established immediately, but rather some time is needed. Moreover, we expect that preparation of a law proposal is also time-consuming process. Both these reasons provide possible explanation of low activity activity.
Starting with the second quarter, there is a substantial surge in activity, with a peak at about one year after the previous elections. A deeper analysis would be required to provide an explanation of this increase. We suggest that it might be connected with fulfilling some of the pre-elections promises. At about half-time of the electoral cycle, estimated legislation activity reaches its local minimum. Next, there is other increase in activity, which continues until the end of the cycle (i.e. until the third period before the upcoming elections, which is due to phenomenon discussed in connection with Figure 4 . -0,0916 -0,1017 -0,1388 -0,0978 (0,0195) 
1). Results of the model with BEle

BEle
Approved (passed) laws
Same analysis as in case of presented laws is performed for approved or passed laws.
We expect to obtain similar pattern as in the former analysis, but with certain lag. This stems from the necessary length of the legislation process, i.e. time between presenting the law proposal and a moment of its approval, as discussed above in text related to the Figure 4 .1
Based on the observed distribution of legislation process lengths, the mean value is 194 days and the median is 189. This suggests the lag in time between the two patterns approximately two quarter. Beside the time lag, analysis performed for approved laws is expected to exhibit less clear pattern. The reason is that length of the legislation process is assumed to be exogenous to a great extent and so the lag between the date of presenting a law and its approval should vary. As before, we start with regression of Pass variable on variable t, which represents time remaining to the expected elections. In this case, we do not include any dummy variable as in the analysis of presented laws, as we expect the legislation activity to be exerted until the elections. Figure 4 .3 depicts result of the regression and the fitted line. Again, we observe negative relationship between legislation activity (in terms of approved laws) and time remaining to the elections However, the model does not pass a test for normality of distribution of residuals -p-value 0,0014, and so the significance tests might be biased. 
Conclusion
A variety of different constituents might have an influence on the extent of legislation activity over an electoral term. The aim of this work is to empirically test and briefly describe one of the sources of this influence: the time to expected elections. We suggest that the time to expected elections is closely connected to politicians' incentives to shift a shape of the cycle in order to raise their chances to get reelected. Nevertheless, we remind that these incentives are not the only constituent of a shape of the cycle over time.
The analysis uses a dataset collected for the purpose of this paper. The data were collected from publicly accessible information provided on web pages of the Parliament of the Czech Republic.
The key findings are following.
(1) Significant negative relationship is found between time to expected elections and legislation activity; the closer the elections are, the higher activity is observed. (2) This relationship is relatively stronger when presented laws are used for construction of the dependent variable. (3) Polynomial fit provided in the analysis shows graphically that legislation activity increases after the elections followed by decrease around the middle of electoral cycle. At the end of electoral cycle, we observe an increase of legislation activity. We interpret the two-peak pattern in legislation activity as a reflection of two incentives that members of parliament face: first, to honor their pre-election promises (the first peak after elections), and second, to maximize political support by voters (the second peak just before next elections). Further analysis might concern empirical testing in other countries and comparing the results. Such comparison might be however difficult due to institutional and legal traditions that differ among countries. Another room for further analysis is to use the same methodology for analysis of different parts of legislation. Here, we analyzed laws connected to transfer payments. Different shape of the cycle obtained from different part of legislation might imply unequal importance of such group of laws for incentives that form political legislation cycles, or a different time structure of such incentives.
